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El Peronismo que no fue: El papel de la lucha política inter-industrial en la temprana frustración del Peronismo de Perón

Carlos Acuña /// El trabajo coloca el foco en el periodo que abarca de los años treinta hasta 1955 para argumentar que las políticas del Peronismo persiguieron incorporar en su alianza constitutiva a la gran burguesía industrial. Y esto no con la mera aspiración de contar con su capacidad de inversión, aunque disciplinada políticamente bajo la conducción del pequeño-mediano empresariado, sino apuntando a que jugase un papel central de liderazgo económico-político sobre el conjunto del empresariado. La razón fundamental de su fracaso en alcanzar este objetivo, por otra parte, no sólo se encuentra en la desconfianza del gran empresariado industrial frente al poder sindical sino, con igual relevancia como causa de la ruptura entre el gran empresariado industrial y el Peronismo, en las contradicciones internas de la burguesía industrial: el trabajo sostiene que el Peronismo “realmente existente” y sobre el que se articuló la matriz de la lucha política argentina a partir de mediados de los años cincuenta, no fue el perseguido por las estrategias estatales implementadas por el gobierno de Perón sino, por el contrario, el resultado del fracaso políticoinstitucional de estas frente al veto de actores en pugna dentro del empresariado industrial. En síntesis, el Peronismo “de Perón” no era el de la triple alianza sino uno que incorporaba con un papel de liderazgo, a la fracción industrial del gran capital.

Multiple Choices: Economic Policies in Crisis

Heymann, D. y Axel Leijonhufvud /// Debt crises have occurred in highly developed countries at the center of the world economy with large and sophisticated financial systems and enormous volumes of transactions in complex instruments. They have equally occurred in peripheral and emerging countries where debt contracts have been plain and simple and the outstanding volume of obligations much smaller in relation to GDP. They have occurred in countries where the domestic standard of denomination entirely dominates and in countries largely relying on foreign currencies. In many cases, they have been preceded by large current account deficits; in others by rough external balance or even a surplus. The build-­‐up to some crises has involved substantial budget deficits but this has not always been the case – even if in the end the crisis itself may produce fiscal trouble. Crises frustrate expectations, threaten the revision of contractual promises and force dramatic revisions of perceived wealth. They are memorable episodes that leave traces in economic behavior and performance for a long time. In this sense, they belong to a family of events. The ironic message of Rogoff’s and Reinhart’s title, This Time is Different (2011), is thus plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose. But all crises have their own idiosyncracies. A crisis that recurrently repeats itself seems a contradiction in terms. When it comes to policies, the particularities matter and are often essential. There is no uniform prescription to fit all cases. The history of the economy and the structural characteristics that result will determine the form the crisis takes. The productive structure and the position of the country in the world economy matter. Of particular importance are the balance sheets 1and cash flows of the major sectors, including governments and the central bank. Recent events have demonstrated that particular types of contracts, especially recently innovated ones, can play a crucial role. All of these factors influence the effects and effectiveness of particular policy actions. A full mapping of policies to circumstances is neither feasible nor desirable. The selection of topics that follows is admittedly subjective.

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